

THE ROLE AND PLACE OF IDEOLOGICAL MATRIXES AND STEREOTYPES IN CLOSED CULTURES

ROLUL ȘI LOCUL MATRICELOR IDEOLOGICE ȘI AL STEREOTIPURILOR ÎN CULTURILE ÎNCHISE

Aleksandra DJURIĆ-BOSNIĆ

*Institute for Culture of Vojvodina,
Vojvode Putnika 2, Novi Sad, Srbija,
e-mail: sasabosnocdjuric@gmail.com*

Abstract

In closed societies manipulative strategies are both unavoidable in order to constitute them, and necessary, in order to keep them closed. Fear from the unknown is programmed, and a desire for the common and uniform constitutive, leading to the repression of the spiritual adventure, death of contemplation, and suicide of thought. Such stereotypes are guardians of collective identity, and form the constitutive principle of closed societies rife for stereotypes of all sorts. In such societies the different type of thought is risky, schematized and stigmatized.

Rezumat

În societățile închise strategiile manipulative sunt în același timp de neevitat pentru a fi constituite, și necesare, pentru a fi ținute închise. Teama de necunoscut este programată și o dorință pentru comun și uniform sunt constitutive, ducând la represiunea aventurii spirituale, moartea din contemplație, și suicidul gândurilor. Asemenea stereotipe sunt gardienii unei identități colective, din principiul constitutiv al societăților închise frecvent pentru stereotipurile de toate felurile. În astfel de societăți tipul de gândire diferit este riscant, schematizat și stigmatizat.

Keywords: *closed societies, closed cultures, stereotypes, ideological matrixes, strategies of manipulation*

Cuvinte cheie: *societăți închise, culturi închise, stereotipuri, matrice ideologice, strategii de manipulare*

In the 20th Century closed societies formed themselves along almost identical lines, regardless of their declared ideological orientation. We find them in the communist China, Cambodia, as well as in the right wing dictatorships in Latin America, the stalinist Soviet Union, and the countries of the Eastern Block, pro-fascist regimes of Franco's Spain, the Nazi Germany or fascist Italy. In spite of their different political design, they share a common authoritarian model of communication, based on rigid ideological indoctrination, simulation and manipulation. In cultures of closed societies the strategies of manipulation are both unavoidable in order to constitute them, and necessary, in order to keep them closed.

Such stereotypes are guardians of collective identity, and form the constitutive principle of closed societies rife for stereotypes of all sorts, fearing everything which comes from the *outside*. In such societies the different type of thought is risky, schematized and stigmatized. Fear from the

unknown is programmed, and a desire for the common and uniform constitutive, leading to the repression of the spiritual adventure, death of contemplation, and suicide of thought.¹

Many years ago, in 1922, Walter Lippmann remarked that of all influences on public opinion, the most subtle and profound ones are those which sustain the repertoire of stereotyping: "They told us about the world before we say it. We have an image of things before we experience them" (LIPPMANN, 1995, 72). Such apriori images Lippmann defined as "pre-conceptions," which, unless we have been educated as to their formation, almost completely direct our processes of perception: "They mark objects as familiar, others as foreign, strange, they indicate and stress difference, so that a bit known seems completely and well known... Motivated, they project with certainty that which only vaguely comes to memory..." (Lippmann, 1995, 72). What is important in Lippmann's insight is the nature of stereotypes as "images in our heads," one the one hand, and on the other the nature of gullibility with which we use them. They both combine to form our *Weltanschauung*: "If such philosophical outlook assumes codification based on a preconceived formula, all our reporting about the world will describe not the world but that formula" (LIPPMANN, 1995, 72). However, if our life philosophy allows insight that the human is only "a small part of the world" and that human intelligence has capacity to discern in the thickness of formulas and ideas the intended stereotype, we will not adhere to them and will "gladly modify them" (LIPPMANN, 1995, 72). Only such a "use" of stereotypes may be relatively harmless given that it allows an awareness about the genealogy of "our ideas and why we accept them" (LIPPMANN, 1995, 72). Under such conditions, all the narrative about history may be made harmless or "antiseptic." More precisely, such a non-contaminated life philosophy which approached with a distance stereotyped images and representations, allows us to discern why a "fable, a textbook, tradition, novel, play, phrase, instilled a certain preconception in a certain perception and not some other" (LIPPMANN, 1995, 72).

According to Richard Dyer, the most important in thinking the phenomena of stereotyping is not their qualification as "false" aspects of human thought, but who controls a them and defines them, why and what interests they serve. Dyer pays a particular attention to the problem of "the social constructions of reality," the centers of power they create, and the ways such stereotypes motivate a consensus: "A stereotype is used in order to express a consensus regarding certain social group, as if such a consensus appeared before the stereotype and independently of it" (Dyer, web.fmk.edu.rs). Therefore, the most important function of stereotypes, to "sustain sharp, but limiting and limited definitions, clearly indicating where the border ends, and thus who is on what side of it as well (Dyer, *ibid.*). A criterium for the intensity of stereotyping he sees in the degree of rigidity of a stereotype, and its ability to penetrate and transform the existing definitions of society.

According to Klaus Roth, the existence of stereotypes, myths and identities is not problematic, but rather the ways in which collectives and individuals relate to them; thus, it is the closed cultures with their rigid founding mechanisms and principles that illustrate best the use of these "images in heads" as schematizing and instrumentalizing representations.² According to Roth, stereotypes may be necessary in our communication with the foreign and other if we use them consciously in a descriptive, and not prescriptive, way, if their "true core" allows for a contact and transformation of an individual or a group, and thus is not convenient for converting into dogmatic codes and matrixes. However, in closed societies, stereotypes are by necessity functionalized, reduced and schematized, structured into dogmatic codes convenient for manipulative ordering, reified into forms of prejudices and clichés, myths about enemies and grandeur of one's nation, xenophobia and shovinizism, or aggressive aggrandizing of one's political program. Given that stereotypes do not transmit themselves on their own, Roth suggests a model of "cultural techniques"

¹ Radomir Konstantinović described the essence of close societies with syntagms «the refusal of spiritual adventure,» «death of contemplation,» «suicide of thought.» See: *Filozofija palanke*, Radomir Konstantinović, Otkrovenje, Beograd 2003.

² About stereotypes as simplistic and schematized representations, see: Klaus Roth, *Slike u glavama: ogledi o narodnoj kulturi u jugoistočnoj Evropi*, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd 2000.

which deconstruct such reductive images, and allow for de-stereotyping, positive reaction to difference, and development of critical thinking as an essential part of cultural identities and their recognition of their worth.

On the contrary, in cultures of closed societies, stereotyped representations form nuclear units of manipulative strategies, always marked by an evaluation, which is rigid, unchanging and politically, socioculturally or nationally instrumentalized. In that sense, cultural technologies of closed societies are directed primarily to the closing off and elimination of the foreign, couched in discourse of collective will which, superior to those of individuals, creates ethically and esthetically problematic systems of value.

While noting the semantic complexity of stereotypes and their practical implications related to their interpretations and definitions, Gordana Đerić indicated that stereotypes may have a necessary cognitive function as shortcuts of thinking and speaking, while at the same time warning that they may also form mechanisms of rethinking and reevaluation. The functions of stereotyping are more important than the values and contents they transport, and thus operating more on the level of performing and doing than on the level of meaning and semantics. Stereotype is a “recognizable mask covering a transmutation, and as such often abused and functionalized in order to direct more complex projects and transformation of the image of the world“ (ĐERIĆ, 2005).

Đerić juxtaposes to the existing stereotypes of deeds and speech, different, silent or voiced stereotypes. A structural analyses of both kinds of stereotypes one may arrive to understanding how they are utilized in closed societies, and by analyzing the cultural context, one can locate and recognize some less prominent, specific kinds of stereotyping. In that sense, one arrives to the recognition that closed societies serve as transmitters of ideologically directed and conoted stereotypes—from ethnic, and political, to racial, religious, sexual and other. Whether silenced or voiced, standing for tendentionally and very effectively muted cliches passing as truths, or voiced and made explicit constructions, stereotypes, in this interpretation, always have a pre-given function.

In closed systems and societies this function is dual: it transforms and transcodes reality according to ideological precepts, and then to conserving thus created social and political order. Thus the function of stereotypes in the context of closed societies and cultures, which not only reduces the field of what can and may be thought or perceived, but also reduces the plurality of thinking and speech to a common denominator, that is to the doctrinal code of the day.

It is exactly such stereotyped perceptions and representations which guarantee the “doctrinal exclusion of thinking“ and necessary premises of ideologized speech in service of “colonization of thought“ and limitation of thinking: “A militant regime of thinking is in the foundation of the doctrinal code which reduces every thought to service and oath. Dogmatic exclusivity imposes to everyone an obligation to believe, to have unwavering faith and belief, while on the other hand anathemize as an infidel and perjurer everyone else who has no hearing for the call of 'the true belief“ (BELANČIĆ, 2003, 17)

Doctrinal reductionism and explicit inclination to stereotyping of the self and other, of the world, as an underpinning of closed cultures, are alien to those systems in which spirituality arises from authentic thinking, creation and unlimited communication.

Thus, in closed societies, all “open creation,“ universal and communicable, must be undesirable, because it is irreducible and unpredictable, poliphonic and formally mobile, oriented to a continuous interaction and creative perception as re-creation of form, meaning and sense (Eko, 1965). In closed cultural systems, as indicated by Radomir Konstantinović in his *Philosophy of Provincial Mind*, instead of artistic freedom in creating truly open works, reigns a violence of normativity based on technologies of stereotyping foundational for perpetuating social enclosure. This accent on normativity rests on the glorification of style, “as result before the process,“ as a preconceived matrix built in after the fact in everything, “including life that comes out of it“ (Konstantinović, 2003, 16). Style becomes a norm, and everything that contradicts it is “rejected with untiring brutality“ (Konstantinović 2003, 16).

Cultures of closed societies completely limit and prohibit potential for movement and change. According to Konstantinović, the normativity of closed societies is predicated on absolute publicity, a “tyranny of disclosure of everything in society, the tyranny of absolute clarity and publicity of all“ (KONSTANTINOVIĆ, 2003, 16). A closed society is a “theater of normativity“ which systematically destroys every exception and individuality.

This violence of normativity based on stereotyping of desirable ideological code, perpetuates itself “in life,“ as noted by Konstantinović, and does not remain only in spiritual realm. The concept of enclosure continuously erases the difference between spirituality and everyday life, producing an ecstatic uncompromising principles of generalisation. To that one can juxtapose authentic cultural production as sphere of genuine spirituality, incompatible with the system of preconceived values in closed societies. Closed societies consider truthful only that which is objective, generalized and supra-individual, and thus by necessity reduce everything individual to the lowest common denominator (ĐIRIĆ-BOSNIĆ, 2011). And in reverse, a sensibility for openness refuses a pre-given concepts and formations, even those that are conditioned and rooted to such an extent that they seem self-explanatory and “natural“ The mission of cultural production and art, as potentially free creative activities, recreate and transform, that is, resist the appropriate stereotyping cultural models which often do not recognize or hinder the creative potential.

In closed cultural models a common ideological denominator connects and binds all parts of cultural system, coordinating it with the dominant ideological matrixes which is the guarantor of the dominant doctrinal code. Under ideological matrixes we understand compatible and coordinated sets of opinions, evaluative imperatives and determinations, which are condensed into stereotypical formations.

Such stereotyped formations which build the basis of ideological matrixes, are reified in the forms of collective myths and narratives, always marked by a hierarchy of value, rigid and instrumentalized, forming manipulative strategies appropriated by a dominant political or social context. The dispersal of ideological matrixes is not limited to one aspect of social system, since it forms the very distribution of stereotyped formations. In that sense, Roth concludes that stereotyping can affect various aspects of life: “In essence, everything may be the object of stereotyping“ (ROT, 2000, 262).

While the object of stereotyping may be social conditions or institutions, historical events and perceptions, the most widespread are stereotypes of preconceived perceptions of social groups, phenomena or events. They are thus also the most conducive to manipulation. The social and historical stereotypes, precisely, construct national identities and initiate collective emotions. Regardless of the object of stereotyping, its method assumes first interpretation, then evaluation, and finally acting according to a certain stereotyped image. Stereotyped representations are objectified by means of verbal, visual, symbolic or reified expressions, and may “conserve historical experiences for centuries“ (ROT, 2000, 64).

According to their complexity, Roth divides stereotypes in three groups: simple language forms such as qualifiers or often stigmatizing attributes (names of places, ethnic groups, or nations), the connections which often develop into stable idioms. Second group is a more complex, and includes stereotypes which are analogous to more complex syntax, which emanate as sentences, comparisons, proverbs, etc., charged with an affective potential which can be intensified according to the ideological needs, even when a stereotype starts to lose its effectiveness. “Many idioms, turns of phrases, comparisons, proverbs, lose their affective potential and become dull, pale metaphors... Such affective potential may be reactivated, however, depending on the political or socio-economic situation or a singularly determined context (i.e. “the Turkish plague,“ “Polish economy,“ “the powder keg of the Balkans,“)“ (ROT, 2000, 265).³ According to Roth's classification, the third

³ Roth underlies how stereotypes in everyday communication are often expressed by means of qualifying and comparative sentences (e.g. “Greek are...“, “Germans are...“ or “sly as a Greek,“ “dumb as a German“) but also as condensed, colourful, linguistic expression denoting a cliché about a certain culture (e.g. “one Greek lies as ten Gypsies“) Rot, 2000, 265.

group consists of even more complex forms of verbal stereotyping, analogous to those found in cluster formations in fairy tales, legends, anecdotes, poetry, prose, narratives, but also, not related to verbal expressions, visual arts, emblems, symbols, monuments, sculptures and caricatures. Such complex structures, semantically and theologically coordinated with the dominant ideological model, make up the body of ideological matrixes which, depending on intensity and duration, are gradually built into cultural space and specifically and significantly mark a certain culture in a certain period.

Roth notices that it is precisely the capacity of stereotyped representations to be rooted in traditional forms, into the collective and “cultural memory of the people,” that makes stereotypes particularly stable and resistant to changes, particularly prominent in the culture of memory and orientation to the past in the countries of South-Eastern Europe. In that regards stereotyped images (be it auto- or hetero- stereotypes as representations of the self or the other) are petrified in linguistic forms, deposited in the vaults of collective knowledge, and as “typisations rooted in the unconscious” very easily preserved, transmitted and distributed by processes of socialisation and acculturation, that is by means of the system of education, media and institutions: “Preconceptions about foreigners and historical representatinos are, therefore, images in the heads built very rarely according to our individual taste, but have been accepted without much protest by us as children, by the process of socializing, and acculturation (education, school, by means of media, i nevery day life)” (ROT, 2000, 276).

Stereotyped images are emotionally saturated “culturally mediated statements,” built into the foundation of cultural, collective, but also personal identities. Roth underscores that each social or national group in some sense is determined by the sets of evaluative stereotypes, images determining the relationship between groups, projecting a determined prescribed identity. In that sense, “each cultural contact becomes determined by a collective or individual experience which left a concrete trace, or found an expression in the specific representations of the other” (ROT, 2000, 270).

In the context of possible manipulation of collective memory initiated by the ideological codification of the past, there is, according to Roth, a close connection between stereotype and myth, similar to the one he establishes between stereotype and identity. Myths are in fact stereotyped, ossified representations of history, stories about an event that took place, narratives considered true in the function of explaining the “roots” but also confirming and legitimizing fundamental values and norms, ideas and modes of behaviour, images of the world or group identity (ROT, 2000, 280).

Myths as constructed images of self and others are to be found in the corpus of elementary values of a society or culture, most often stressing the collective hystorical experience, in order to serve its self-determination. However, if myths are ideologically utilized and functionalized, they are as a rule compatible with the dominant doctrinary code and are, in such cases, utilized as a political means of legitimizing the power of state, nation, party or ethnic group, at the same time limiting and stigmatizing others, strangers, foreigners, etc.

According to Roth, after the fall of socialism, which was not only a political-ideological system but “influenced practically all aspects of everyday life,” South-Eastern Europe, confronted with the period of disorientation, and loss of security in the sphere of everyday culture, in the process of re-constitution of social classes and elites, was confronted with the need to find new social and political orientation. This search was most of the time turned towards the past which then served to found new cultural memory: “Those symbolic constructions of mythical past represent a turn towards some imaginary 'once upon the time' legitimizing political action today. Such returns to tradition and folklore vouchsafe national identity and at the same time from the past project some secure and safe world into the current moment, the return to national history, by necessity excluding some groups and including others, even the blessed world of socialism” (ROT, 2000, 289).

The appearance of new social contexts, the breakdown of familiar life surroundings, and the loss of security, initiated, according to Roth, new national and ethnic consciousness, religious and

cultural fundamentalism, nationalism and nostalgia for socialism in the form of certain “retrograde reactions.” This activated and formed new stereotypical representations of the West but also prejudices about ethnic minorities as well as a denigrating relationship to the national neighbors. Negative stereotyping initiates negative expectations which precede adversarial and stigmatizing behaviour based on existing prejudices, as well as the ceaseless creation of new ones. A cultural space saturated with stereotypes, hinders the flow of information, since stereotypes are as a rule based on limited information or, such is the case in closed cultures, on subjective positions, wishes or values of “influential individuals”: “People may nurture firm stereotypes about other cultures never having met its single member. Besides that, stereotypes perpetuate themselves, since we are inclined to focus on events and behaviour selectively in order to confirm our stereotypes, and ignore information which contradict them” (TOMAS, INKSON, 2011, 6).

In cultures of closed societies such mental images about self and others are tendentially constructed in order to support and perpetuate a pre-given ideological projection of desirable collective or individual identity. In such a way all key determinants of stereotype formation, tendentiousness, generality, simplification, banality, uniformity, unchangeability, continuity and stigmatization, tend to manifest themselves as natural “carriers“ of ideological matrixes, making possible and effective as such a conglomerate of manipulative strategies coordinated with the dominant cultural code.

In order to define “new post-postmodern neo-humanism,” Paul Kertz posits as the “central question” the possibility of new humanistic renaissance, in relation to objective ethical standards, “the ‘habitual moral orderliness’ and the ‘value of excellence’”. Ethics should not be perverted into a subjective taste or whim... Even though we perceive among values a wide diversity, there are general ethical norms which apply to the humankind in general.” (KERC, 2005, 50). One value and inheritance of humanism according to Kertz is a social theory which rests on democracy and open society, essentially tied to human rights, politically and economically emanating as philosophy of tolerance and respect of differences, “superseding cultural relativity and offering general norms of behavior. Humanism offers universal point of view, based on the commonality of science and shared values. Since it recognizes cultural differences, such world view construes a world community beyond ethnic, racial or religious divisions” (KERC, 2005, 50).

Given the existence of general/universal ethical norms that lead across the borders of cultural differences, Kertz is attentive to the point of view which can overcome borders of local multiculturalism, finding the goal in “conglomeration of moral principles which form the base of world culture and civilization” (KERC, 2005, 178).

Such cultural paradigm is bound by respect for differences and overcoming of narrow ethno-cultural chauvinisms of the past, but also by creation of “the new world civilization” in which values form a global category: “This option may be achieved only if different world cultures integrate at a new level, and live together in peace and agreement” (KERC, 2005, 177). According to Kertz, this possibility is at the same time a civilizational challenge of the modern world. Such humanism is able to help create new order, which would overcome “old competitions” and create “more general world culture” without erasing cultural diversity, traditions and specificities: “The need to keep valuable cultural inheritance and institutions is not thus denied, but at the same time we should be willing to model a planetary civilization which cuts across separate cultures” (KERC, 2005, 178).⁴

⁴ Kertz’s view of challenges and advantages of multiculturalism may be applied in full onto the space of ex-Yugoslavia traumatized by violence: “Multiculturalism has its positive aspect which is valuable and worthy of defense. We must not repress cultural minorities or be intolerant to them. And this happens often” (Kerc, 2005, 176). However, even though multiculturalism has a strong ethical demand to respect cultural differences and makes a plea for “tolerance”, at the same time it may have a negative aspect since it “may encourage social communities to live in separation and isolation, carefully over-cultivating their own specific history and tradition” (Kerc, 2005). This inclination may potentially yield to mistrust and animosity: “We can find proof to that in tragic confrontations between the Hindus and Muslims on Indian Subcontinent, Jews and Arabs in Palestine, or ethnic hatred which was unleashed in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Such separatist position contradicts global civilization just now being born” (Kerc, 2000, 177).

Global communication network may guarantee realization of the new, “democratic,” humanism, in which cultures and cultural politics, being potentially enlightening, occupy dominant space. The space of intercultural communication, globally confronts uniformity, enclosures, xenophobia, ideological prescriptions and violence. Global application of intercultural communication would confirm in practice global humanism posited by Kertz, together with reform of cultural systems, media and education, attaining a new level of global ethical consciousness. “Each violation of human rights would this be immediately known and resisted, and dictatorial regimes will no longer be able to do evil without being punished, without being called to task by the world community. No people or culture can any longer claim right to immunity to the universal declaration of human rights, or deny its application to their own citizens” (KERC, 2005, 178).

Intercultural sensibility suggests a consciousness that “people share common human values—in spite of cultural differences” (KERC, 2005, 182). In that sense, socio-ethical and cultural province should not “end in ethnic enclave or national border” since ethical rationality directs to “building institutions of cooperation, and, whenever possible, negotiate differences peacefully. A larger claim means that unbiased ethical rationality should be valid for all human beings with equal dignity and value” (KERC, 2005, 185). This implies deconstruction of established, archaic, rigid, manipulative ideological matrixes and stereotyped formation, founding of new culturological paradigms based on the model of openness, promoting politics of intercultural interaction and communication. This leads to redefining the notion of interculturality, mutual understanding, intercultural contacts, processes, and possibilities of interaction and mingling, practices of cultural encounters bereft of confrontation. Cultures are thus seen not as closed entities, but as systems of open possibilities inclined to mobility and change, human behavior as a meeting of cultures.

Theoretical definitions of the term “interculturality” indicate that the term “inter” point to a meeting and coexistence of cultures, perceiving in themselves their own alterity, a meta-space of openness, empathy and tolerance. B. Stojković noted that “parallel coexistence of cultures” in intercultural spaces, forms a dynamic, effective cultural strategy when applied globally to the relationships between national cultures thus allowing a redefinition of European cultural identity as well (STOJKOVIĆ, 1993, 141).

In his search for the “idea of culture,” Terry Eagleton indicates that we are confronted with the world in which some are “too certain who they are,” while others are “sure too little.” Thus, a tendency in post-modern culture to encompass both, “the politics of identity” and “the cult of the decentered subject.” However, according to Eagleton, post-modernism “is not universalist but cosmopolitan,” and while the global space of postmodernism is hybrid, the space of universalism is unitary: “Universal is compatible with the national, the universal culture experiences itself as a gallery of the finest works of national cultures, while cosmopolitan cultural experience traverses national boundaries as freely as money or transnational companies” (EAGLETON, 2002, 95).

And while universalism belongs to the high culture and cosmopolitanism to the culture of global capitalism, internationalism could be understood as a “form of political resistance,” to such a world. Regardless of the plurality and variety of its forms, it is precisely culture that is interconnected with “beliefs and identity, and enmeshed in doctrinal systems.” And thus Eagleton concludes, “Culture is not only that with which we live. It is also, to a great extent, that *for* which we live. Inclination, friendship, memory, kin, places, community, feeling, intellectual pleasure, the sense of ultimate meaning: all this is closer to us than the declarations of human rights or trade deeds” (EAGLETON, 2002, 156). Nevertheless, this “proximity,” warns Eagleton, if not placed into an enlightened political context, may easily slip into obsessive morbidity.

Zygmunt Bauman notes a paradox or eternal circle of the relationship between cultures and political systems, indicating a “collusion” between those in power against the “endemic freedom of culture,” which culminates in a reason for war: “Culture cannot live in peace with power, especially not with the imposing and sly power, which has as its goal subversion of the needs of culture to experiment and search, in order to appropriate it into the rational frames imposed by the rulers”

(BAUMAN, 2009, 71). Such tendentious, appropriative and utilitarian reversal of culture leads into ideologically motivated violence.

After the Apocalyptic experience of destruction of cultural, social and political space of the former Yugoslavia, resulting in a bloody dissolution and ultimately its demise, Edward Said's warning about the repetition of "imperial cycles" seems to have found its correct verification: "We live in global environment with a great number of economic, social, and political pressures which tear apart its only vaguely understood and ultimately un-interpreted and not-understood body. And everyone who has even a mere notion of this unity is disturbed by the fact that inevitably selfish, narrow interests, such as patriotism, chauvinism, ethnic, religious and war hatred—may bring to mass annihilation. The world simply cannot allow for this to happen so many times" (SAID, 2002, 67).

It is certain that the ideologized culture always threatens new reductions and destructions of cultural context and politics of authentic individual and collective freedoms and rights. The space of culturological intervention in the contemporary world order is indissociable from individual and existential rights, with common mission: annulling unitarism, closures and banality, as well as warding off any kind of symbolic or real violence.

How to cure the world from this destructive "nationalistic ethnic and racialized passions"? Especially when even great philosophy like that of Martin Heidegger is read, without scrutinizing its ethical consequences. Paul Kertz answers that it is possible to maintain that human beings are capable of free and independent choice, that they can be rational and responsible, that it is possible to set up universal ethical norms, to believe that the ideals of liberal democracy have true value, and ultimately to construct "metanarratives of emancipation."

Kertz concludes that totalitarian societies of the 20th Century used pseudo scientific ideologies, and used the obstruction of reason as a threat to openness in societies and cultures. In this context new metanarratives may be utilized to deconstruct retrograde ideological matrixes and lead the way to "A feeling of responsibility which needs to be instilled in publishers, editors, producers and writers, to preserve truth and obligation of raising the level of scientific understanding and critical thinking" (KERZ, 2005, 71).

In such a way, after the anticivilisational entropy of the late 20th Century, one could generate and posit, on the side of the humane and the good, a newly found global meaning, against ethical and esthetic relativism and fatal collective euphorias of the regime generated manipulative strategies.

Bibliography

- Bauman, Zigmunt, *Fluidni život*, Mediterran publishing, Novi Sad 2009.
- Belančić, Milorad, *Genealogija palanke*, Narodna knjiga, Beograd 2003.
- Dajer, Ričard, web.fmk.edu.rs/files/blogs/2009-10/mi/medijska_kul/ricard-dajer.pdf (08.09.2014.)
- Đerić, Gordana, *O nemim i glasnim stereotipima*, Filozofija i društvo 1/XXVI, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd 2004.
- Đurić Bosnić, Aleksandra, *Poetika tamnog vilajeta – Radomir Konstantinović o duhu palanke u srpskoj književnosti*, Službeni glasnik, Beograd 2011.
- Eko, Umberto, *Otvoreno delo*, Veselin Masleša, Sarajevo 1965.
- Iglton, Teri, *Ideja kulture*, Naklada Jasenski i Turk, Zagreb 2000.
- Kerc Pol, *Kako preurediti savremeni svet*, Filip Višnjić, Beograd 2005.
- Konstantinović, Radomir, *Filosofija palanke*, Otkrovenje, Beograd 2004.
- Lipman Walter, *Javno mnijenje*, Naprijed, Zagreb 1995.
- Rot, Klaus, *Slike u glavama*, Biblioteka XX vek, Beograd 2000.
- Said, Edvard, *Kultura i imperijalizam*, Časopis Beogradski krug, Čigoja 2002.
- Stojković, Branimir, *Evropski kulturni identitet*, Prosveta, Niš 1993.
- Tomas, Dejvid, Ikson, Ker, *Kulturna inteligencija*, Clio, Beograd 2011.