

SOCIO-CULTURAL CAPITAL AS THE BASIS OF WORKING STRATEGY OF HOUSEHOLD/FAMILY IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: THE EXAMPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA AND THE NORTH OF KOSOVO*

LE CAPITAL SOCIO-CULTUREL – LA BASE THE STRATEGIES DE TRAVAIL DANS LES FAMILLES POST-CONFLICTUELLES : LE CAS DE LA REPUBLIQUE SERBE ET DU NORD DU KOSOVO

CAPITALUL SOCIO-CULTURAL - BAZA STRATEGIILOR DE MUNCĂ ÎN FAMILIILE POSTCONFLICTUALE: CAZUL REPUBLICII SÂRBE ȘI KOSOVO DE NORD

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Abstract

This paper represents the result of comparative research of socio-cultural capital features as the basis of working strategies of household/family in post-conflict societies of former SFRY/Western Balkan. Republic of Srpska and Kosovo represent case studies due to a set of similarities which are inherent to those social frameworks, and certain specificities which are making them "original" cases in social researches. Our research results indicate a sort of retraditionalization of the role of post-war family members including their endeavour to maintain functionality and unity of family "at all costs" in societies of "high risk". Besides, those results point to a set of other strategies individuals and their households undertake in order to preserve "normality" of everyday life in societies which are facing the prevailing nationalistic ideologies twenty or fifteen years after the open armed conflicts termination, which "hinder" the establishment of peaceful conditions for life and work. In the first part of the paper, we are indicating the timeline of events being shaped by the two mentioned societies in the form of post-war societies in order to visualize the importance of socio-cultural capital more clearly, as the condition to develop the working strategies of post-war family households.*

Rezumat

Lucrarea de față reprezintă rezultatele cercetărilor comparate ale specificului capital sociocultural realizate în baza strategiilor de lucru ale familiilor în societățile post-conflictuale din fosta Republică Socialistă Federativă Iugoslavia / Balcanii de Vest. Republica Sârpska și Kosovo reprezintă studii de caz din cauza unui număr însemnat de similitudini inerente în aceste medii sociale, dar și datorită unor anumite specificități care transformă aceste cazuri în cazuri "originale" în mediul cercetărilor sociale. Rezultatele cercetării noastre indică întoarcerea rolului valorilor tradiționale membrilor familiei postbelice, inclusiv efortul lor de a menține funcționalitatea și unitatea familiei "cu orice preț", în societățile de "risc ridicat". Ele indică o serie de alte strategii întreprinse de unele persoane pentru a păstra situația cotidiană "normală", în societățile în care și după cincisprezece sau douăzeci de ani după încetarea conflictelor armate se "împiedică" stabilirea condițiilor pașnice pentru viață și muncă. În prima parte a lucrării, se indică cronologia*

evenimentelor fiind modelate de cele două societăți menționate în formă de societăți postbelice, pentru a înțelege mai clar importanța capitalului socio-cultural precum o condiție a dezvoltării strategiilor de lucru în familiile postbelice.

Key words: *socio-cultural capital, household, post-conflict/post-war society, post-socialist transformation, Republic of Srpska, Kosovo*.*

Cuvinte cheie: *capital socio-cultural, gospodărie, post-conflict / societate postbelică, transformare post-socialistă, Republica Srpska, Kosovo*.*

Post-conflict societies of the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo* - Sociological approach to their specificities understanding

Post-conflict society became a usual phrase for the characterizing of societies appeared by the disintegration/destruction of former SFRY; although for those societies is more often applicable the official use of the phrase “Western Balkan”.¹ Post-conflict societies are characterized by a newly established condition of *peace* and initial conditions for the achievement of tolerance and resolute *commitment* of the former warring factions to live in the same social frame in new peaceful circumstances as well. Post-Yugoslav area is inherent a war legacy (1991-1999), whose consequences have not been overcome yet. In contemporary societies in that area two contending aspects are dominating, which may be described from one side, as the desire for reconciliation and determination of „personal“ but not „collective“ responsibilities for the consequences of wars, but from the other side, the attitude that interculturality is not sustainable in Western Balkan in real sense of the word. In the meantime, a daily political rhetoric of *reconciliation* has prevailed, and declarative desire for euro integrations of the mentioned states, due to which the official statements of those states representatives are more affirmative when it is spoken about today's neighbours, and former citizens. Thus, during the past fifteen years it may be noticed a gradual transition of Western Balkan from the zone of armed conflict, afterwards through the region in which democratic, economic, and security-related circumstances are established, until the one in which political elites of some states are oriented toward the European Union access.

Nevertheless, the specificity of Bosnia and Herzegovina (and the Republic of Srpska within this state) is reflected in the achievement of at least minimum of common interests of three irreconcilable ethnical groups (Serbian, Bosniak, Croatian), which is reflected in the signing of Dayton's Peace Accord (by which negotiations of belligerent parties, under the auspices of USA, terminated on 21st of November 1995).² The greatest achievement of the Dayton's Peace Accord was the halt of four-year civic war. Nevertheless, even today, twenty years upon that accord signing, there are a lot of unsettled issues, which are directly reflected to everyday life of all social

¹ It is about political and media construction which serves in the last ten years as the marking of the majority of the territory of former Yugoslavia and Albania. Namely, in the summit of the state's members of European Union held in Thessaloniki 2003, the post-Yugoslav space was called „Western Balkan“ by which the geographic determination of South-eastern Europe was marginalized and excluded from the use, with the neglecting of the construction of *post-Yugoslav area* so as emerging states and their citizens supposedly make distance from the common past of life in the same state as soon as possible. “Western Balkan“ means the states of the former territory of Yugoslavia, without Slovenia adding Albania (Svilar, 2010, 503).

² The Accord was signed officially on the 14th of December 1995 in Paris by former representatives of the mentioned ethnical groups: Alija Izetbegović (Bosniak), Franjo Tuđman (Croatian), and Slobodan Milošević (Serbian). By that accord the dispute over territories, as the most sensitive issue of negotiations, was settled „in favour of“ the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (51%) in relation to the territory of other entity – Republic of Srpska (49%). Besides the issue of territory, that accord implies the recognition of the existent international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as “rights of entities to establish 'parallel special relationships' with adjacent countries“ and obligation “to respect standards of basic human rights and freedoms“ (SLOVIĆ, 2011, 345).

actors, and one of them is the one of integration or division of Bosnia and Herzegovina in further future (SLOVIĆ, 2011, 350).³

The case of Kosovo* is to be a specific one – territory which, after the entry of NATO troops and UN administration⁴ into the area of this Serbian province (June 12th 1999) it became the one under international protectorate.⁵ Sixteen years after the entry in the territory of Kosovo*, UNMIK has been losing its former legitimacy bearing in mind the fact the representatives of that mission exists only in the Northern part of Kosovo*⁶, including a minimal number of employees while Albanians ignore each reference to that mission.⁷

Serbs from the Republic of Srpska (within Bosnia and Herzegovina) faced similar pressures, which had, regarding Kosovo*, a guaranteed position of internationally recognized entity by the mentioned Dayton's Peace Accord.⁸ The North of Kosovo* as per some features of its, is similar to

³ On the negative consequences of the Dayton's Peace Accord, that is implementation of "Bonn's authorizations" by the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina see in already quoted paper of Košarac, Milošević-Šošo (p. 2014, 530).

⁴ КФОР/KFOR (Kosovo Force) and УНМИК/UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo). In KFOR there are soldiers whose states are not members of NATO. Leading role in the troops command belongs to leading European countries such as: Great Britain, Italy, and from 2011 exclusively Germany and Austria, although the troops command is as per the rule based on the principle of „rotation“ of commanders from different countries whose soldiers are in the service of the mission in Kosovo*.

⁵ Central tasks of UNMIK administration, immediately after the protectorate establishment, should have enabled the following:

1. „Establishment of functional interim civic administration including maintenance of law and order;
2. Promotion of essential autonomy and self-governance establishment, including the hold of elections;
3. Facilitation of political process for future status of Kosovo determination“ (YANNIS, 2004, 67).

Mission of KFOR was also based on the Security Council Resolution (SCUN) 1244, and KFOR was supposed to do the following:

1. Monitors, verifies and, where necessary, harmonizes requirements from military-technical agreement and demilitarizes KLA;
2. Establishes and maintains a secure environment, including public security and order;
3. Provides assistance to the Mission of United Nations in Kosovo, including basic state functions until their transformation, in order to facilitate peace and stability in Kosovo (YANNIS, 2004).

KFOR, as per the Article 11 of the Security Council Resolution 1244, was supposed to provide a secure environment in which all refugees and internally displaced persons would return to their homes. "UNMIK mandate was almost unprecedented pursuant to the standards of UN in the field. Not only was it authorized to take a full responsibility for interim administrative governance over the territory of Kosovo, but it got a central political role in conflict resolutions as well" (YANNIS, 2004, 61).

⁶The North of Kosovo* is still mostly inhabited by Serbs, and Serbs are boycotting institutions of "Republic of Kosovo".

⁷ In the official reports, the work of UNMIK mission was assessed as unsuccessful as well, while it is emphasized that „international interim administration did not manage to create a necessary atmosphere for multi-ethnic society“ (GARCIA-ORRICO, 2009, 153). The work of KFOR mission may be also described as controversial⁷, taking into account the "March violence" (in March 2004), when around 3870 people were expelled (mostly Serbs), and 35 religious buildings of the Serbian Orthodox Church were burned, out of which 18 were the monuments of culture, and 3 Orthodox graveyards were desecrated. In the respective reports of the international community representatives is stated „inability of the international civic and security-related presence to prevent ethnically motivated violence in March 2004 – five years after the intervention – gave a heavy blow to their credibility and cast serious doubts in the possibility of future peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo“ (GARCIA-ORRICO, 2009, 153). In the post-conflict period bigger than one decade, Kosovo* had featured the phases of open conflicts succession, ostensible tolerance among antagonistic groups and new conflicts, which indicated again the need for international organizations presence, and monitoring of newly established institutions „strengthening“ of „the Kosovar Republic“.

⁸ Besides, Serbs in the Republic of Srpska represent the ethnic majority, which was not to be the case with Serbs in the whole Kosovo*, and due to that their everyday life takes place in the form of fear from the possible expulsion from their homes. Pressures on the Serbs in the Republic of Srpska (RS) are more intense from institutional point of view, which is reflected in constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) mostly without the consent of one constitutive part (entity) representative – the Republic of Srpska. Those pressures are not being reflected in the form of Constitution changes, but in the ones regarding some legal provisions as well as interference in "economic policy creating a legal framework for foreign companies activity, which led to an enormous foreign trade deficit and destruction of the remained enterprises of BiH" (KOŠARAC, MILOŠEVIĆ-ŠOŠO, 2014, 530).

the Republic of Srpska. Although it has not been recognized as an official entity in „the independent Republic of Kosovo“ yet, at everyday institutional and political level, that territory is not under the powers of the authorities from Pristina. The similarity is also in the fact that Serbs in the North of KiM constitute a distinct ethnic majority, and have special links with (their republic) Serbia from whose state budget, all its institutions are being financed. As such, the North of KiM has been surviving for fifteen years as “the last defence line of Serbian state“, that is, the last obstacle on the road of sovereignty completion of “the Kosovar state“.⁹

Hence, we can only speak conditionally on post-conflict territory of the North of Kosovo*, taking into account numerous actions of citizens’ security violation,¹⁰ but on the territory of “conflicts of low intensity”¹¹ where the limit between “conflict” and “post-conflict” is unclear, and everyday life of citizens deeply subordinated to that unclear demarcation line. Hence, in Northern part of Kosovo*, it cannot be essentially named as a post-conflict “territory” until institutional setup has been established, which would be recognized by all actors in the field (“international community”, Serbian, “Kosovar”/Albanian institutions), and such scenario is imposed almost exclusively through the integration of Serbs into “the Kosovar institutions” (which Serbs have been opposing for years).¹² Taking such daily political circumstances into account, it cannot be supposed where the peace will be established essentially, but rather entering a new phase of “low intensity” conflict, which would leave new consequences to everyday life of all social actors.

The importance of working strategies for the survival of household/family in post-war societies of the Republic of Srpska and Kosovo*

In post-conflict societies whose members are facing a set of inconveniences in institutional-political view, there is the whole segment of social actors life, which is known in social sciences as “everyday life”. That, at first sight, simple word in the societies which are in the focus of our researches, represents a core of all people/nations survival in post-conflict societies, and especially the ones belonging to demographically fewer ethnical groups. That is the reason why we are interested in studying the effects of “survival” of social actors in the two post-conflict societies (RS and Kosovo*) from sociological point of view at the same time. We approached the research of working strategies being implemented by social actors in the field of everyday life, and whose essential objective is the preservation of functionality and integrity of family in social framework of the undermined sovereignty and personal integrity, which necessary led to a weakening of all social organizations.

⁹After the so-called *July crisis* broken out on 25th of July 2011, since a group of special forces of Kosovo police tried to take over its control at administrative borders in the North of Kosovo, Serbs radicalized efforts to distinct from the rest of that Serbian province. Physical barricades were set up on the roads connecting northern part with the rest of province, and the whole day attendance of population whose role was to prevent Kosovar or EULEX police to pass through the North of Kosovo*. Since then the role of KFOR has become dominant, due to the fact former supreme commander Erhard Biller, had the role of negotiator with Serbian politicians. Negotiations were held in Brussels at general dissatisfaction of the Serbs from Kosovo* with the achieved agreements. So, a socio-political misbalance occurred, taking into account the fact official negotiating teams of Serbia and Kosovo were reaching agreements, while local population was resisting more intensely to the efforts of barricades removal. After many unsuccessful attempts in the second half of 2011 in the municipality of Zvečan, KFOR had obtained permission for live ammunition use, what happened on the 1st of June 2012 where three Serbs were wounded.

¹⁰In the first two months of 2013, in Northern part of Kosovska Mitrovica, echoed twenty explosive devices – on houses, terraces of flats, and cars of those town inhabitants.

¹¹In daily political purposes more often is being used phrase “zone of frozen conflict”.

¹²In the near future, some changes arising out of the signing of “Brussels’ Agreement” (19th of April 2013) may be expected, and holding of “Kosovar” local elections in the whole territory of the province (November 2013), after that the elected presidents of municipalities in the North of the province “agreed” to rule local governments pursuant to laws of “the Republic of Kosovo” (under the condition to proceed to the establishment of the Community of Serbian municipalities). Although there is a chance that those changes lead to the establishment of institutional order, which may be considered as legitimate one by all political actors in KiM, dissatisfaction by “new reality” (which suggests a more transparent presence of “the Republic of Kosovo” in its North) may cause some new violent actions by “some malcontent” from the opposed ethnical group.

It is about the comparison of the two (research) case studies – in the example of RS and KiM societies. Technique for data collecting in RS was questionnaire (489 interviews in 297 households) while in Kosovo* 120 in-depth interviews were conducted with family members of different ethnical groups.¹³ Although different as per its nature, way, speed and “depth” of the obtained data from the respondents, those two research groups are complementary to each other. They are employed in that way in this research, and in the purpose of more meaningful sociological understanding of strategies in action, which are in the sphere of everyday life inherent to actors in post-conflict societies. Basically, we were interested in working strategies of households in post-conflict societies, but indirectly we reached data on interpersonal relationships of family members, that is, on the revitalization of traditionally-patriarchal structure of the family. Thus, we were able to compose a sort of “mosaic” of everyday life features of individuals and their households in the two post-conflict societies.

Working strategies of households were in the focus of our interest due to the fact the mentioned societies are passing through, besides post-conflict, two-decade post-socialist transformation (which further aggravated the strategy of “survival” of individual in post-war societies). At the same time, the term “working strategy” is realized as “the notion by which analogously to the strategy in general, important, basic and long-term objective of the activity of society and its individual organizational units are determined, and in accordance with that, the most appropriate routs, means and organizational forms for directing of individuals and groups activities are also determined” (MILOŠEVIĆ, 2011,170). It follows that working strategy of the family (that is, household), as the basic social community, is always compatible with general socio-economic conditions of society whose part that family (household) is. Bearing in mind the collapse of state institutions in the period of post-war and much too long post-socialist transformation of societies of former SFRY, the mentioned traditionally inherited specific patterns are one of the most important reasons of the survival of functional family households at the same time. The survival of those households in the conditions of chaotic change in their everyday life, is conditioned above all by intrafamily solidarity, and those potentials of family which are contained in the “competences” of its members in their motivation, intrafamily relationships, and the ones of the family and its members toward narrower and wider social environment.

One more argument of family households survival is relevant in the described social conditions – in sociology known as socio-cultural capital of family. That kind of capital “within which the struggle of man for existence is viewed from the wider cognitive aspect, from the aspect in which economic relationships and ties are interwoven with interpersonal and group-like socio-cultural ties and relationships” (MILOŠEVIĆ, 2011, 172), represents the key of sociological understanding of family survival in crisis-stricken social circumstances¹⁴ Understanding of socio-cultural capital (in our case family) is in direct connection with Bourdieu’s understanding of “symbolic capital”, which represents a sum of socio-cultural values whose driver is tradition, due to which, besides economic (measurable/physical) capital “a part of unrecognized calculation of donor must be taken into account, in order to meet their needs, regardless of the fact they *are pretending* not to notice those calculations in such reciprocal relationship” (BORDIEU, 1999, 206).

Following the example of RS and Kosovo* societies working strategies of family households, and within them, socio-cultural capital of families receive their full meaning, which is transformed from socio-theoretical to the applied everyday life’s aspect. For both societies being in

¹³In the North of Kosovo* interviews were conducted exclusively with women because of the fact the researcher (in this case, also, woman) was neither able to talk to the men from some ethnical groups from that area (because of traditionally/mysogonally motivated rejection by their members), nor she had security conditions to conduct interviews in central and southern part of Kosovo* (which are mostly inhabited with ethnical Albanians).

¹⁴ In this paper the notion/phrase of socio-cultural capital “corresponds more to the problem understanding which is in connection with household strategies, as the ones of a kind of organized activity in the sphere of family earning, and the notion/phrase of human resources and the one corresponding to it, human capital, point to the individual orientations of family members which are providing them with opportunity (chance) to appear in the market and provide existential resources for himself and his family as well” (MILOŠEVIĆ, 2011, 173).

the focus of our research (RS and Kosovo*), it may be said they are in the phase of transitional modernization, which is featured in the determination of the market way of business doing, and still in the initial phases of civic society building. The basic similarity of those societies is featured in the fact they are passing the phase of post-socialist transformation compounded by the disintegration of the former common state (SFRY), war damage, international isolation, hyperinflation, and entry of foreign military and civic troops into those territories under (simplified) explanation of “peace establishment”.¹⁵ Those processes conditioned a very important similarity which is “the reverse side” of general socio-political circumstances being afflicted to the societies of RS and Kosovo* – collapse of the system of value, disorganization and “self-abandonment of the individual” – to his own everyday life. Should we bear in mind that everyday life is non-reflective field of social life, which “does not explain itself, does not understand itself, does not reflect itself, and it does not have a distance toward itself” (BLAGOJEVIĆ, 1995, 182), it is more clearer the necessity of sociological research and understanding of processes which are immanent to everyday life of people in post-conflict societies. Working strategies of households are one of the more important part of everyday life, due to which they are to be in the focus of this research.

Empirical indicators of working strategies in post-conflict societies of the Republic of Srpska and the North of Kosovo*

Empirical indicators of family households’ strategies in post-conflict societies of RS and the North of Kosovo* which are conditioned by the features of socio-cultural capital, derived from the methodological framework of our research. We have already emphasized that in the territory of RS were conducted 489 questionnaires (in 297 households), and in the territory of Kosovo* 120 in-depth interviews. Therefore, replies to the questionnaire, that is questions posed within in-depth interviews, provided by the respondents-members of families individually or „on behalf of household“ within the analysis of the obtained data – are considered to be relevant semantic element creating socio-cultural capital of family and having impact on the working strategies shaping of their households.

Understanding of socio-cultural capital of household/family from some respondent’s perspective

Individual, through the belonging to family as a primary social community, and other social groups as well, belongs at the same time to the whole social structure. Bearing that in mind, we tried through the self-perception of the own belonging to some social class/stratum (following the example of the RS respondents), that is through the understanding of own life conditions (in the North of Kosovo*), determine the initial parameters of socio-cultural capital of the mentioned societies families.

In the case of RS respondents, more than three quarters of the respondents considers to “carry” the middle class potential (collective replies to belong to the middle or upper middle class), while the replies to consider themselves as the members of the upper and low class have almost the same (low) representation (*Table 1*). Due to the features of the chaotic post-socialist and post-war transition of the society of the Republic of Srpska, it is probably a relative indicator by which the respondents – “from their perspective” – see their class potentials in the whole of that and the society (as such). In this respect, it is the most general indicator on the fact what are the possibilities of socio-cultural capital of their family, which working strategies of household rely on.


¹⁵Although RS and so-called “Republic of Kosovo” represent to some extent recognizable independent entities/states, the impact of Western countries on the political decision making is apparent, due to which it cannot be talked on sovereign territories. Even though we are talking only on the North of Kosovo* as the territory which is still under the direct supervision and financment of the Republic of Serbia, we are talking at the same time on the territory being under intense international control and supervision.

Table1: Self-perception of social class belonging

Consider to belong:	Number	%
Upper class	6	1.2
Upper middle class	50	10.2
Middle class	341	69.7
Labour class	84	17.2
Lower class	8	1.6
Total respondents:	489	100

In the case of the respondents/female respondents from the North of Kosovo*, due to the special characteristics of in-depth interview as research technique, they have not been required to declare themselves on the self-perception of class belonging, but to describe their living conditions. This research shows that, out of the total number of respondents 27 (67.5%), of Serbian families live in their apartments, and out of the total number of Albanian families 25 (62.5%) of them live in their apartments, 10 (50%) families from Bosniak ethnical group live in their apartment, and (100%) of Roma families live in their apartment (Chart 1).¹⁶

Chart 1: Do you live in your house/apartment?



Should we compare those findings (from the territory of Kosovo*) with the “claims” of respondents from RS, where 76% of respondents thinks to belong to “the middle class” it may be said we reached the congruent statements even during the research conducted in Kosovo*. Nevertheless, belonging to “the middle class”, which is exclusively based on self-perception of their and the status of their family in the given social area, is more conditioned by the fact of everyday life of all family members “all together”, “under the same roof”, and employment of one or more members of family household. When individuals “see” their living conditions in that way, they take into account the fact in most cases in their milieu there are people living in “much more difficult” living conditions, so therefore they consider themselves the members of “those middle”.¹⁷

¹⁶Roma families live in their apartments from 2011 since the settlement under the title “Roma mahala”, in Southern part of Kosovska Mitrovica has been built, under the auspices of international organizations.

¹⁷ Respondents do not talk on classes, but use the terms “less”, “more” and “middle”. Qualitative technique to which the research conducted in the North of Kosovo* was founded, indicates the commitment of the researcher to hear, first of all, “the voices of ordinary people” and their perception of their everyday life, but we are aware of the limits making the results subject to critics of economic sociology.

Bearing in mind the fact class interests in each society of inequalities strive to be protected by institutional and non-institutional mechanisms, it was necessary to determine whether that kind of “protection” may have impact on the reinforcement of socio-cultural capital of families (belonging to different classes). Thus, institutional reinforcement of socio-cultural capital of family appears to be as the second important fact of some groups social position in post-conflict societies of RS and Kosovo* (what is partly seen in the data from the *Table 2*). From these data, it follows that family represents a respective part in it, no matter it is about the fact whether we wished to know which collective acting (“institution/organization/group”) supports their socio-cultural capital (the share of family is one third – 28,8%) or whether we asked them in which way their socio-cultural capital is achieved (share of personal connections and acquaintances, which are mostly the part of family relationships – 20%).


Table 2: Opinion of respondents on the fact which kind of organization or institution best protects the interest of members of society to which they belong today

Institution/organization/group	Number	%
State	73	14.9
Political parties	11	2.2
Syndicates	25	5.1
Professional associations	20	4.1.
Family	141	28.8
The man himself protects his interests the best	219	44.8
Total number of respondents	489	100

The fact that the largest share of respondents within this research conducted in RS (73, 6%) believes that family interests are best protected by the family itself or individual within the family, indicates the strong “turn” which the citizens of post-socialist and post-war societies had already experienced in the transition period, at least when it is about the trust (distrust) in the state institutions. Such belief of respondents is founded on the feeling of “abandonment to yourself” in turbulent in the war and post-war years, due to which the trust (distrust) in institutions (first of all, state) is almost “assumed”, even two decades after the war.

Congruent results were obtained in the research conducted in the territory of the North of Kosovo*. Nevertheless, here it is about the territory which is still passing through “the conflicts of low intensity”, which are reflected in efforts of Albanian authorities from Pristina to take over the institutional control over the North of that territory (which is still under the institutional control of the Republic of Serbia). Bearing that in mind, respondents belonging to the two most numerous/antagonistic ethnical groups – Serbian and Albanian – still talk declaratively on the trust in institutions of Serbia (Serbs), that is, Kosovo* (Albanians). Nevertheless, thanks to the research advantages of in-depth interview, we managed to find out from the interview with respondents/female respondents that certain number of Albanians in the period after 2008 (when Kosovo* unilaterally proclaimed its independence) more rely on financial assistance from their relatives living and working abroad, than believe to the institutions of “the state of Kosovo”, which may be noticed in the illustrated way below (*in Chart 2*):

Chart 2: Material assistance to respondents



The similarity noticed in both researches is very important (in RS and KiM), and it tackles the respondents emphasize that some facts, which reinforce their socio-cultural capital (such as personal “acquaintances”) are very important in the way of employment obtaining as the condition for existential survival of their family. The *Table 3* clearly illustrates it, and especially when it comes to respondents from RS:

Table 3: Opinion of respondents on the fact how important are acquaintances with other people (friends, acquaints, relatives, neighbours) for regular, additional or better job finding for their household members

Importance of acquaintance for job	Number of households	%
Very important	112	37.8
Less important	10	3.4
The least important	13	4.4
Irrelevant	161	54.4
Total number of households	296	100

Although slightly more than a half of respondents, within the research conducted in RS, think acquaintances are “irrelevant” for job obtaining, the second half of respondents believes in the opposite; which is completely congruent with the statements of the interviewed from KiM. Respondents from Kosovo* emphasize that without acquaintance “connection” “you can achieve nothing”, not only in the way of job obtaining but for less important everyday activities (for example, issuing of personal documents, queuing up with the doctor etc.). The importance of personal acquaintances is so pronounced in all ethnical groups, that it is almost “implied”, which leads us to the conclusion on the revitalization of traditional patterns of assistance provision in the conditions of social (state) institutions collapse. That indicates at the same time the exclusive focus on resources of their own families, by which our claim has been confirmed on the importance of socio-cultural capital within primary familiar relationships for the members of RS and Kosovo* societies survival in post-war conditions. It appears from the research conducted in RS that people in that milieu are more ready to deploy their additional efforts in the way of (self) employment, and not to direct exclusively on “someone’s” assistance in job obtaining (which is the case with larger part of respondents from the North of Kosovo*). (*Table 4*).

Table 4: Opinion of respondents on that which job strategies more successfully secure resources for their family life

Business strategies	Number	%
Residential place change for better job or greater earning	40	8.7
Work each paid job	49	10.6
Work longer than normal working ours	38	8.2
Work more than one job at the same time in different companies	61	13.2
Work job below your qualification with significantly higher salary	14	3.0
Work with full-time job additional jobs under the contract (part-time jobs)	64	13.9
Working informal jobs in informal economy	6	1.3
Acquire new knowledge, skills	65	14.1
Initiate some own business	72	15.6
Establish and own company or with other owners	52	11.3
Total number of respondents	461	100

Therefore, people from the North of Kosovo* are more or less aware of the high rate of unemployment, so that some (still) expect more the assistance of state (mostly respondents of Serbian ethnical belonging), while others (mostly of Albanian and Roma ethnical belonging) “turn” more toward their own private business or/and work in private sector. The entrepreneurship, as the initial step toward the employment, is reflected in the way of job search. The example of the North of Kosovo* indicates the importance of earlier “acquaintances” thanks to which they obtained jobs (mostly men). Out of the research conducted in RS follows that 73,3% of respondents believe they will obtain a job by the official state institutions (such as the Job Centre). Such replies of respondents from RS indicate the presence of certain trust in institution of state (since it is about the state entity which Serbs are treating with respect), differently from the ones from the North of Kosovo*, whom, at the very mention of formally existent state institutions for employment from the North of Kosovo*, reacted with contempt and ridicule (since in that milieu the institutions of Serbia are largely collapsed). Nevertheless, out of both researches we may take the conclusion that respondents foster the belief they will at least manage to obtain some kind of social support, when official state institutions cannot guarantee them any (decent) job. Therefore, some similarities may be noticed among the respondents of both post-war (and post-socialist) social entities, which are reflected in the belief that political participation (either of respondents or their family members) is very important for job obtaining. Therefore, they think that “political engagement” in conjunction of “right people knowing”, makes a “winning combination” in the way of their employment or the one of their family members and, at the same time, desirable social mobility. That may be especially illustrated by data from the research conducted in RS (Table 5).

Table 5: Opinion of respondents on that what is the most important today for advancement in the society

The most important for advancement in the society is:	Number	%
Origin from rich family	40	8.2
Qualitative education	45	9.2
Ambitiousness	54	11.1

Hard work	28	5.7
Knowing of right people	117	24.0
Political engagement	122	25.0
Willingness to take risk at work	41	8.4
Dexterity in compliance with statutory requirements	8	1.6
Obedience	33	6.8
Total number of respondents	488	100

Out of three, in sociology most frequently stated canals of social mobility (education, dealing with politics, marriage contraction), it has proven that dealing with politics is “the most secure” capital of individual, what is stated out by respondents themselves, indicating it is the way to help their family members to obtain the employment or the adequate (“better”) working post. The lack of that “capital” is an important obstacle for employment in post-war years of RS and Kosovo*. A greater number of unemployed respondents agrees on that, either respondents from RS who are not active politically, and who state that “they do not know right people”, they “are not members of the party in power” or the ones from the North of Kosovo*, who say they do not have an appropriate job since they “are not politically suitable” due to earlier and now inappropriate political attitudes which are now familiar to their local community members and political elites having great power in that community. Although respondents in both researches state that education and hard work should have been real values, which will provide individuals with “decent life”, they sum up it is not the case in their societies. Nevertheless, when they are talking on their own engagement in everyday life, then respondents/female respondents emphasize their family household members – in the way of their own social position improvement – apply socially the most desirable strategies; primarily through the commitment for hard work and more rarely for qualitative education. For that claim, data from the research conducted in RS are especially illustrated (*Table 6*).

Table 6: Opinion of respondents on that which strategy prevails in the effort of his/her household to improve its social position

Strategy which prevails	Number	%
Origin from rich family	1	0.2
Qualitative education	125	25.6
Ambitiousness	33	6.8
Hard work	298	61.1
Knowing of right people	10	2.0
Political engagement	6	1.2
Risk readiness at work	7	1.4
Dexterity in compliance with statutory requirements	2	0.4
Obedience	6	1.2
Total number of respondents	488	100

Such replies partly indicate the efforts of respondents to keep up “normality”, which was immanent to their family households before the war circumstances. Although it may not be surely claimed that respondents/female respondents during the interview with the researcher were not assessing which replies would be “the most desirable”, and data listed in *Table 6* clearly indicate that they in their strategies of “survival” rely on their own resources, primarily on “hard work”. In both researches, respondents/female respondents have the feeling of strong need to deploy all their resources for the preservation of functionality of their own family households, through employment

and searching for the employment, through psycho-social support provision to other members of family, and through common spare time passing. On that way, they say they are being engaged in the activities available to them, since their basic priority is to preserve “the family unity”.

How respondents/female respondents understand socio-cultural capital of their household in the conditions of post-war and post-socialist transformations

The application of different working strategies (and in post-war societies the strategies of elementary survival) is one of basic features of market relationships in modern societies. Bearing that in mind, post-war/post/socialist societies of Western Balkan have real basis for those “divertive” strategies application. “Nevertheless, each possible working strategy is not compatible with democratic character to modern societies guidance. Thus, in market oriented way of business doing, such working strategies may be developed, which do not support the development of social relationships” (MILOŠEVIĆ, 2011, 185). In the societies with the developed market relationships, working strategies are in compliance with institutional regulation of the entire “state apparatus”, from which it follows that market relationships and processes are trying to be in compliance with formal legal and informal socio-cultural values (“business ethics” and humanization of the entire social relationships). Taking into account that general knowledge on modern societies, it is difficult to suppose that post-socialist and post-war societies have only positive features, which would condition working strategies of individual development, their households and different organizations in which they are operating. Therefore, already mentioned collapse of value system and distrust of individuals in state institutions, indicate an unnecessary “dexterity” of the official state institutions to support their citizens in the way of working strategies development.

It is shown that, in the example of RS, mostly men, (“heads of family”) decide on the material resources disposal; while in the North of Kosovo*, men “are leaving” that commitment increasingly to women. The first case is a clear indicator of traditionally-patriarchal social pattern, which has been revitalized in post-war social conditions, while in the second one we are finding a kind of paradox that men more often leave to women the disposal of household resources, because it is about very restricted resources which are not sufficient for meeting the needs of all members of its. Therefore, women are given only one more (ungrateful) and callous responsibility in the sphere of everyday lifetime survival of their families. Therefore, the similarity in both societies is reflected in the fact the greatest part of household budget “goes” to the consumption (housing, food, hygiene, education of children and their “pocket money”), so that they have little or no resources for any “investments”, which would be a driver of more qualitative life of the family in the future.

It follows that the greatest number of family households live in shortage, although at the beginning of this research they classified themselves in the category of “middle class” (RS) or “those of middle class” (the North of Kosovo*). All jobs that can be performed in households independently, and without the paid assistance (production of food and drinks, self-repairing appliances at home, painting, repair of clothing/sewing, and care of children, elderly, sick without institutional support of the society) are performed by their actors independently. The available knowledge and skills of family household members, therefore, represent the basic “human resource” or the framework of working strategies of family households in post-socialist, and primarily, post-war societies of RS and (the North of Kosovo*).

Socio-cultural capital of family and possibility (impossibility) of household working strategies in the Republic of Srpska and in the North of Kosovo*

(Instead of conclusion)

In the previous analysis we argued some empirical findings on the families socio-cultural capital features, and their households in societies passing simultaneously through two complex processes – the process of post-socialist and the one of post-war transformation. Those processes of “long duration” (of the two decades), conditioned life, work, habits, and formation of life of the entire generations which do not remember the essential peaceful social conditions in life in socially

safer conditions (a kind of socialist “welfare state”, in former Yugoslavia). Those social factors, which in turn remember them, speak about that period with sadness and nostalgia, but everyday life as the core of social life of individual “now and here” inexorably “forces” those individuals to finding strategies – primarily of survival, and afterwards the ones for family progress.

By this research contribution we indicated some congruity (incongruity) of the two post-war societies (RS and Kosovo*), which, until two decades ago, belonged to the same society. We did that from the perspective of family socio-cultural capital, which appeared to be as an important fact of possible working strategies of households in the societies of post-war and post-socialist transformation. The basic conclusion we reached in both researches was an equivocal belief of the author/researcher the trend of strategy of “survival” would be continued (at least one decade). Nevertheless, the more those two post-war societies “are moving away” from the initial conditions of transition, such as privatization, democratization, reshaping of working organization in accordance with market-related transactions (which will result in their competitive involvement in international market economy), “the more family strategies will shift significantly: from service-productive-consuming toward classical consuming function of household, but such consuming function which will assume new contents directed toward the improvement of life quality of its members” (MILOŠEVIĆ, 2011, 190).

Such trend has not been visible yet in societies being in the focus of our previous analysis (societies of RS and Kosovo*). Due to that, we will be able to claim that actors/households from both societies in the future will exclusively rely on “human resources” and socio-cultural capital of the family, since in the two-decade transition period it has proven the family is the basis not only of psychological but socio-economic security as well. Possible changes of household strategies in both cases – societies of RS and Kosovo* – will be in near future under the impact of chaotic strategic (post-socialist and post-war) business orientations. Therefore, there is a dominant strategy orientation not only in business, but in the entire social organization as well, which in those societies has got for its basis a neoliberal ideology (MILOŠEVIĆ, 2004b, 143). It may be expected from that strategic orientation to “have impact on the adaptation of family strategies to other organizational forms of labour (production, distribution, exchange, and consumption), and to have impact on all of them (together), in order to shape them in that form providing necessary harmony with socio-cultural specificities of religions and local milieu, in order to reach greater profit” (MILOŠEVIĆ, 2011, 191). In such circumstances, there would be evident values such as qualitative education and hardworking, and which would give local population the possibility to improve social position of their families, households, and their own.

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