

## **Phantasia, a Mediation between Perception (Aesthesis) and Thought (Noesis)**

### **Phantasia, une voie de médiation entre perception (aisthesis) et pensée (noèse)**

### **Phantasia, o cale de mediere între percepție (aisthesis) și gândire (noesis)**

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#### **Abstract**

*The present paper aims at analyzing the creative force of phantasia, as it reveals itself in various works of art. The concept of phantasia defines the affectivity stirred in the mind of the spectator immediately after ceasing the physical contact with the image, sound, form or colour. This psychological state is opposed in meaning to the apatheia, as pathe (the affectivity) is associated with the affects, which are, in their turn, bound to the bodily perception and senses. Pathe gives dynamism to the phantasia triggered at the end of the sensorial contact and it stimulates the illusions. Only the human being, in its ephemeral passage through existence, can experience the state of phantasia. This specific state is the mingle of perception and judgement which leads to a certain "impression" that we can relate to the illusion, appearance or the fiction we delude ourselves with but which, at the same time, constructs our identity in the realm of culture. The two ontological levels – dream and reality – will never be conciliated; on the contrary, they will eternally keep on alternating in the illusion of fiction. Through this illusion we give life to imaginary things and events and this strive draws together both perception (aisthesis) and thought (noesis). When perception fades away, representation sheds its light on forms, contents, colours, sounds, words, all these being the fittest tools for the artistic expression. Yet each chimeric frame we bear inside is nothing but our cultural identity, "the measure" (as Protagoras said) of our phantasia or, consequently, of the illusion we lived in and we imagined in and by culture.*

#### **Résumé**

*Cet article se propose de réaliser une analyse du pouvoir créateur de la phantasia, objectivée en différentes œuvres littéraires et philosophiques. Le terme de phantasia mesure l'expérience affective produite au moment où le contact sensoriel avec l'image, le son, la forme et la couleur cesse. Cet état est opposé à l'état d'apatheia, parce que pathe (les sentiments) sont liés aux réactions émotives qui sont expérimentées par l'expérience et les sensations du corps. Pathe dynamise la phantasia déclenchée au moment où le contact sensoriel cesse, et il entretient les états illusoire. Seul l'être humain, dans son éphémérité, est éprouvé par la phantasia. Cet état est une combinaison entre perception et jugement, qui détermine une certaine « impression » qu'on peut associer à l'illusion, à l'apparence ou à la fiction avec lesquelles l'on se dupe soi-même, mais avec lesquelles l'on peut se définir dans le territoire de la culture. Les deux plans ontologiques – le rêve et la réalité – ne vont jamais connaître la réconciliation. Au contraire, ces deux niveaux vont alterner à travers une illusion éternelle dans la fiction. Par illusion on comprend des choses et des faits imaginés, une*

*démarche qui met ensemble la perception (aisthesis) et la pensée (noesis). Lorsque la perception s'éteint, la lumière de la représentation apparaît et acquiert une forme, un contenu, un son, un mot, les outils les plus adéquats de l'expression artistique. Chaque contour illusoire que nous portons en nous ne représente autre chose que notre identité culturelle, la « mesure » (Protagoras) de la phantasia, de l'illusion que l'on a vécue et imaginée dans et à travers le monde de la culture.*

### **Abstract**

*Articolul își propune să realizeze o analiză asupra puterii creatoare a phantasiei, obiectivată în diferite opere literare și filosofice. Termenul phantasia măsoară trăirea afectivă produsă odată cu încetarea contactului senzorial cu imaginea, sunetul, forma, culoarea. Această stare este opusă stării de apatheia pentru că pathe (afecțiunile) sunt legate de afecte pe care le încearcă trăirea și simțirea corporală. Pathe dinamizează phantasia declanșată în momentul încetării contactului senzorial și întreține stările iluzorii. Numai ființa umană, în efemeritatea ei, este încercată de phantasia. Această stare este o combinație între percepție și judecată, determinând o anumită "impresie" pe care o putem asocia iluziei, aparenței sau ficțiunii cu care ne amăgim, dar ne și clădim, pe tărâmul culturii. Cele două planuri ontologice – visul și realitatea – nu vor cunoaște niciodată concilierea. Dimpotrivă, aceste două niveluri vor alterna printr-o veșnică amăgire în ficțiune. Prin iluzie nădăjduim lucruri și fapte imaginate, demers care pune laolaltă atât percepția (aisthesis) cât și gândirea (noesis). Atunci când percepția se stinge, apare lumina reprezentării care capătă formă, conținut, culoare, sunet, cuvânt, uneltele cele mai potrivite de exprimare artistică. Fiecare contur iluzoriu pe care îl purtăm în noi nu reprezintă altceva decât identitatea noastră culturală, "măsura" (Protagoras) phantasiei și iluziei pe care am trăit-o și imaginat-o în și prin lumea culturii.*

**Keywords:** *Phantasia, illusion, imagination, chimera, vision, culture.*

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**Cuvinte cheie:** *Phantasia, iluzie, imaginație, himeră, viziune, cultură.*

### **Phantasia as an expression of aesthetic sensitivity**

The concept of *phantasia* defines the affectivity stirred in the mind of the spectator immediately after ceasing the physical contact with the image, sound, form or colour. This psychological state is opposed in meaning to the *apatheia*, as *pathe* (the affectivity) is associated with the affects, which are, in their turn, bound to the bodily perception and senses. *Pathe* gives dynamism to the *phantasia* triggered at the end of the sensorial contact and it stimulates the illusions. The way our soul quivers reveals, as Plato implied, "ascension", a "solicitude" which can speak for our individual sensitivity. This specific state is the mingle of perception and judgement which leads to a certain "impression" that we can relate to the illusion, appearance or the fiction we delude ourselves with but which, at the same time, constructs our identity in the realm of culture.

In his work, *Truth or Knockouts*, Protagoras saw man as "the measure of all things: of things which are, that they are, and of things which are not, that they are not". Referring to the title of Protagoras' essay, we can infer that man is the only creature which can equally reveal the truth and demolish it as if the two intentions were comparable in value. The disjunction from the title can have, in this case, a similar meaning with a conjunction in which both elements are supported with the same ardour. Man cannot see anything else but what he knows and this measure is a proof of our collective heritage. We measure "all things which are" from within our own cultural frame, which is both our inheritance and our burden in life. However, "things which are not" belong to the realm of fantasy and fiction and denote the passage from the physical world to the imaginary one as they represent visions about a possible (but not real) universe.

Philo of Alexandria described the blessed state of the human being having a mystic experience, the communion with their divine nature:

”And this is the order of things according to nature, when the mind, being entirely occupied with divine love, bends its course towards the temple of God, and approaches it with all possible earnestness and zeal, it becomes inspired, and forgets all other things, and forgets itself also. It remembers Him alone, and depends on Him alone” [1].

Plotinus confesses a similar mystical ecstasy; moreover, this philosopher believes that salvation can be achieved through one’s seclusion within oneself and the distancing from the impure shell of the earthly body. Only the Soul can contemplate virtue, justice and moderation and those who can grasp them are overwhelmed with joy and wonder as they have reached the true Beauty: “This is the spirit that Beauty must ever induce, wonderment and a delicious trouble, longing and love and a trembling that is all delight”[2].

Only beautiful souls are truly able to see Beauty, to “tremble” and feel “delight” to raise the divine within themselves to the universal divine. In contrast, “an ugly Soul” is “dissolute, unrighteous: teeming with all the lusts; torn by internal discord; beset by the fears of its cowardice and the envies of its pettiness”[3].

Plotinus refers to a wonderful beauty which he believes to belong to a superior world, a spiritual reality which streams from the “Intellectual Principle” which can be found beyond the corporal, as the body is the root of all passions and desires. The wonderful Beauty represents for Plotinus the spiritual state in which the Intellect exalts the divine side of the human being. According to Porphyrius, Plotinus even confessed that he was ashamed for having a body and was striving to free his soul by communion with the Universal Life-Principle. The human beings could break free from the bonds of materiality by following their hopes and striving to reach perfection, the Absolute. Such an endeavour cannot reject *phantasia* as it is the way to surprise ourselves in wonderful and ridiculous contradictions: “The fact is that in our ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions”[4]. The amazing thing is how we give birth to our ideas about what we see, hear, feel or smell, those appearances about things around which we consider true: “Man is, as you declare, the measure of all things — white, heavy, light: of all such things he is the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true to himself”[5].

As Socrates implied opinions accompany all human states: “The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me”[6]. The sensation experienced is given by a healthy part of the body as all human experiences are influenced by the harmony of the body and its corroboration with a healthy mind. Thus a harmonious mind can lead to truth and justice while “he who has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him”[7].

The wise men have the most trustworthy opinions according to Plato:

”I say that they are the physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants — for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations — aye and true ones; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for whatever appears to a state to be just and fair so long as it is regarded as such, is just and fair to it”[8]. Plato’s criticism is driven towards poets and story-tellers who deliberately mislead the people:

”Because, if I am not mistaken, we shall have to say that about men poets and story-tellers are guilty of making the gravest misstatements when they tell us that wicked men are often happy, and the good miserable”; and that injustice is profitable when undetected, ”but that justice is a man’s own loss and another’s gain—these things we shall forbid them to utter, and command them to sing and say the opposite”[9].

The poets’ illusion eludes the strive for justice as it serves for simple stories with no moral implications, however, as Plato counsels for bringing to the public eye stories about brave, moderate, pious and free men “Did you never observe how imitations, beginning in early youth and

continuing far into life, at length grow into habits and become a second nature, affecting body, voice, and mind?" [...] he asks and, as imitation builds characters, "Neither should they be trained to imitate the action or speech of men or women who are mad or bad; for madness, like vice, is to be known but not to be practised or imitated"[10]. In spite of Plato's opinions, modernity will raise these characters to a privileged status as they will become heroes for tragedies and comedies.

Imitation in the work of artists, those remote ghosts of the eternal truth seem to Plato as being condemned to fault, illustrations of ignorance and thoughtlessness as the present the knowledge for one thing instead of another and create an inherently false perception. The fault is attributed to unthinking which casts the mind outside reason and drives it away from the world of Ideas.

Nevertheless, Plato does not reject all poetry and has a clear vision on the importance of the poets in his Republic. For instance, in putting myths into rhyme the poets should keep in mind that a "God did what was just and right", and should refrain from implying that gods might have been mistaken or exaggerated in their punishments: "but that those who are punished are miserable, and that God is the author of their misery—the poet is not to be permitted to say; though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God"[11].

The way people imagine beauty "would appear also to lie in the interval between pure being and absolute not-being"[12]. Such a generous interval encourages the formation of models in one's soul which cover the vast array from human to the divine and are useful to the city and to its rulers. The Muse which is beloved to the people can bring delight through poems, a "charm" which is useful to both the rulers and the life of the citizens.

In the 5<sup>th</sup> part of his *Republic*, Plato enlarges upon the concept of "illusion", the charm in a painter's work which makes it different from craftsmanship: "A painter will paint a cobbler, carpenter, or any other artist, though he knows nothing of their arts". That can happen because the painter, just like all artists, "can do all things because he lightly touches on a small part of them, and that part an image".

Some can easily be deluded by the imitator as they are "unable to analyse the nature of knowledge and ignorance and imitation" [13], however, "we ought to consider whether here also there may not be a similar illusion. Perhaps they may have come across imitators and been deceived by them; they may not have remembered when they saw their works that these were but imitations thrice removed from the truth, and could easily be made without any knowledge of the truth, because they are appearances only and not realities?"[14]. We can infer from this that imitation has its own power – it can create an illusion, it is the charm enfolding the spectator who can no longer think of what really is, but of what appears to be. Still, in Plato's view, the illusion maker does not create, but imitates:

"Then the user of them must have the greatest experience of them, and he must indicate to the maker the good or bad qualities which develop themselves in use; for example, the flute-player will tell the flute-maker which of his flutes is satisfactory to the performer; he will tell him how he ought to make them, and the other will attend to his instructions?"[15].

Such obedience applies also to the eye or ear of the audience in art seen as imitation which can trigger stronger or fainter illusions, according to the degree in which the spectator's mind is inclined to accept influence.

#### **Phantasia, value with a cathartic effect**

In his reference to the cathartic value of art, Aristotle maintains Plato's idea that illusion can have an educative function and it can bring delight and recreation. Furthermore, following Plato's implications, music can be perceived by the audience with different degrees of intensity. Some of its effects on a hearer's soul can be fear or pity whereas "enthusiast" songs are the most appropriate for soothing such feelings:

"Fear and pity may be aroused by spectacular means; but they may also result from the inner structure of the piece, which is the better way, and indicates a superior poet. For the plot ought to be

so constructed that, even without the aid of the eye, he who hears the tale told will thrill with horror and melt to pity at what takes place. [...] we must not demand of Tragedy any and every kind of pleasure, but only that which is proper to it"[16].

From the previous quotation follows that such illusion as that created by tragedy can uplift the spectator's soul to the magnificence of a hero's actions upholding positive moral values. In tragedies, "thought" has the role of generating emotions: "such as pity, fear, anger, and the like; the suggestion of importance or its opposite"[17]. "The element of the wonderful is required in Tragedy. The irrational, on which the wonderful depends for its chief effects, has wider scope in Epic poetry, because there the person acting is not seen". "The wonderful" is desired by the audience, "as may be inferred from the fact that every one tells a story with some addition of his own, knowing that his hearers like it"[18]. The hunger for "wonderful" is augmented by the charm or illusion of the impossible; people choose impossible stories which convince to be true over possible stories which are hard to believe. The absurd of a story makes it even more desirable because, in this case, what people cannot achieve in their everyday existence is brought to life in the illusory world of the stage.

"But once the irrational has been introduced and an air of likelihood imparted to it, we must accept it in spite of the absurdity. Take even the irrational incidents in the Odyssey, where Odysseus is left upon the shore of Ithaca. How intolerable even these might have been would be apparent if an inferior poet were to treat the subject. As it is, the absurdity is veiled by the poetic charm with which the poet invests it"[19].

Aristotle believes that the Reversal of Situation (*Peripateia*) which had been brought to stage by Sophocles to change the relation between the divine and the order of events, is made more complex by Euripides, who combines it with the Recognition: "A Complex action is one in which the change is accompanied by such Reversal, or by Recognition, or by both" [20].

*Peripateia* will exalt the imagination of artists to come securing its position in modernity. In modern drama, *Peripateia* will often emerge in the very first act to increase the spectators' interest in the development of events. As Émile Faguet noticed, "Comme les Grecs, nous prenons dans une âme humaine une force simple que nous donnons comme le caractère tout entière, écartant le reste, et cette force, une fois connue du spectateur, reste, telle qu'il la connaît, jusqu'à la fin"[21]. The illusion of *Peripateia* will open more ways of projecting feelings to a public who are eager to discover all that surpasses the boundaries of allowable and brings forth what is inherently human.

For Plotinus, experiencing beauty induces "wonderment and a delicious trouble, longing and love and a trembling that is all delight"[22].

Human soul has similar feelings when loving, as it is the case with the admiration for a beautiful body that all can see, but not everyone is struck by its charm. For Plotinus, however, it is the soul that gives beauty to the body. Only the divine inside the human Soul can ensure its communion to the eternal Beauty.

The chimera of bodily beauty can "darken" and "cast gloom over" Intellect, for Hades, the blind god, dwells both among shadows in the Inferno and in the world of the living. Our world can therefore be mended only by the strive to enrich the Soul:

"Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine"[23].

This labour for reconstruction described by Plotinus is meant to bring the human close to the imaginary model and to Beauty, as Beauty can only be seen by those who are beautiful themselves. Imagination (*phantasia*) leads every "sculptor" who carves his own self and shines upon his earthly shell the beauty inside. For Plotinus, the awe towards the divine is the measure of one's existence

and intellect. Humans need to perfect themselves by taking the path of the divine and leaving behind all that is alien to the divine, all that burdens the spirit holding it back from the reach of freedom. Thought (*noesis*) is favoured thus as a way to grasp meanings without the help of the polluted body. Pure souls will abandon the “daub” added to them in the moment of their birth, but other souls will find themselves forced to bear their muddy daub for an indefinite existence. This is how Plotinus can give expression to the ineffable, by means of his *phantasia*.

### **Phantasia as an illusion of identity**

Renaissance brings full freedom to *phantasia* bringing together both works of art that illustrate ideals of mankind and passions for the pagan Antiquity. Don Quixote is the ultimate expression of cultural illusion as all action happens at an imaginary level with no connection to reality. The world of illusions takes shape in the mind of the troubled Knight of the Sad Countenance fuelled, nevertheless, by his innocent belief in the power of good, purity and other uplifting values he trusts in spite of the sad performance he shows to the people around. It is still a manifestation of *phantasia* which reveals the illusion of unfulfilled love. By remaining painfully far away from his imaginary realm, Don Quixote becomes a herald for the condition of heroes in the modern novel.

The two ontological levels – dream and reality – will never be conciliated; on the contrary, they will eternally keep on alternating in the illusion of fiction. It is exactly this illusion that stimulates the character’s progress through action regardless of the painful strokes cast on him by reality and by the other people who fail to understand his “madness”. Don Quixote’s ideals and sadness are expressions of the human chimeras and failures in general. His aspirations find echo in the existential crisis of the modern soul. The dramatic mask of the man who fought windmills and herds of sheep has become the embodiment of the innocence which throws the weak against the harshness of life. By his sacrifice, Cervantes’ character becomes an eternal hero of “irrational visions” which will become the main failures of the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

Thus, Don Quixote has become the embodiment of the illusion you follow in painful but naïve and tender solitude. N. Râmbu said: “Fascinat până la delir de lumea adevărului, a binelui, a iubirii, a frumuseții și a tuturor valorilor pozitive, Don Quijote este altfel decât restul oamenilor care sunt orbi din punct de vedere axiologic”[24]. (“Fascinated, up to a state of delirium by the world of truth, goodness, beauty and other positive values, Don Quixote is different from all other humans who are blind from the perspective of axiology” – our translation). For the people blind to values, reality is here and now. Don Quixote’s solitude can belong to any one of us when fighting for an ideal which is not shared by the others. The Knight of the Sad Countenance fulfils his illusion in gaining recognition for his way of seeing life through a personal axiology. He is a prototype for a human ideal and for a way of living, a sublime lunatic walking the world in any time, space or circumstance.

The fact that such a character driven by his idealistic illusion has universal value, reintroduces the belief in the existence of a world of fascination, and of our own ideas unseen by the others. It is a duality similar to the one proposed by Plato, where the world perceived through senses was just a shadow of the eternal world of Ideas. Nevertheless, we must never forget that, what we build in our minds adds to our personal culture and from this follows that “o lume care va continua să râdă de Don Quijote este demnă de râs” [25], (“a world still laughing at Don Quixote itself deserves to be laughed at” - our translation). We might add that, if we cast away the illusion, Mambrino’s helmet becomes a simple shaving basin!

Giving up illusions means giving up your own culture. This is a warning coming from the pre-Socratic philosophers themselves, from Mysos who describes the illusory existence of the mortals: “Ignorance and talkativeness bear the chief sway among men. Opportunity will be the most powerful. Cherish not a thought. Do not be fickle, or ungrateful”[26]. Mysos, according to Diogenes Laërtius, recommended a likable behaviour and the likable, the beautiful will be an ideal the modern people drive towards by creating more and more elaborated cultural illusions.

For more than twenty years, taking as compass the intensity of imagination, Gaston Bachelard strived to put together various artists like: Chagall with his painting and his Bible with all the prophecies he had imagined, Claude Monet with his water-lilies from Île-de-France, Vincent van Gogh and Rimbaud, who gave freedom to words and meaning to vowels, "Porteur de blés flamands ou de cotons anglais"[27]. Henri de Waroquier with his Oedips, sculptor Eduardo Chillida and his "iron spells", Louis Marcoussis for whom divination is an advice for the future, and Albert Flocon's landscape where he illustrated a vegetal "will of power"[28]. Here he uses as a metaphor "the water of the eye" where the pupil is a well and on the circles of the iris float boats with sales"[29]. In his view on the universe, the primordial elements are transformed in life: man is rock and woman is earth.

When writing about Flocon's engravings, Gaston Bachelard addresses the eye as the eye can understand both the truth of form and the truth of mass. The impression imprinted in his soul by Flocon is comprised in a "testament" of the engraver: for the engraver, all that is mild in life must become rough in his work and thus he will show the world a rough mildness[30]. For the engraver Albert Flocon, forms can be compared to an initiation: "the form that has just been carved will further give birth to the true forms"[31]. Flocon's favourite "tools" for depicting the links of consciousness are certain motifs: the rope, the spider web, the loop made of paper or cardboard and the snail shell. The loop becomes a symbol of tenacity and stability while the snail shell is a spiral piercing the clouds"[32]. One can find here symbols of ascension, power and the life going on after death. Such force of imagination brings Flocon close to Constantin Brâncuși for whom the diamond shaped "beads" of the Sky Column represent the rebellion against death. As Grigorescu noticed about the Romanian sculptor: "From the ancient symbolism of the Sky Column, he retained only the central element: ascension as an attempt to transcend the human condition"[33].

Insisting on the relation between mask and face, Gaston Bachelard sees "the artificial as a means to defend what was both a way to assert a new life and a rebirth"[34]. The mask helps us to accomplish our right to duality and is thus a means to sooth the pain of alienation. By dissimulation the human being can surpass communication breakdowns and create the illusion of novelty and regeneration.

For Sartre, words are the main mean to express phantasia: "Depicting real objects with real words that were penned with a real pen, I'd be hanged if I didn't become real myself"[35]. Such a way of assuming oneself is as if that person would watch oneself "from outside like a stone" (comme une pierre)[36]. "The human reality which is I assumes its own being by understanding it"[37]. Moreover, "Being will be disclosed to us by some kind of immediate access-boredom, nausea, etc., and ontology will be the description of the phenomenon of being as it manifests itself; that is, without intermediary"[38]. When existence has no meaning, "he is afraid and would like *not to be there*; but his responsibility pursues and overpowers him, and that is why he forces himself to forget as quickly as possible his moment of Nausea. But *he is there*, he feels that his existence is unjustified, and *he is of necessity afraid*"[39]. This fear refers to the identity and responsibility imposed by any cultural being who "depicts" his work according to his own imagination.

*Phantasia* in its unicity can encompass a projection of the future world. To imagine such a projection does not mean to come closer to the world perceived by senses, but to get near the inside world of imagination. This is how Borjes depicted the world beyond the colours seen by eyes: "Un homme fait le projet de dessiner le Monde. Les années passent: il peuple un surface d'images de provinces, de royaumes, de maisons, d'instruments, d'astres, de chevaux, de gens. Peut avant de sa mort, il s'aperçoit que ce patient labyrinthe de formes n'est rien d'autre que son portrait"[40].

**The conclusion of the research is:** each labyrinth of forms, the illusion we bear inside is nothing but our cultural identity. The way we imagine the future is the consequence of the values we have appropriated and observed, conditioned by the society, but reflected by our own personality. From this follows that everyone holds the hope for his own Utopia. As Oscar Wilde warned us, "A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at, for it

leaves out the one country at which Humanity is always landing”. However, “when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and, seeing a better country, sets sail”[41].

Illusion means sacrifice; it is a curtain covering what you wish to replace from reality. It is a cloth for protection which drives away discontent by comforting our mind with the thoughts we like. Through this illusion we give life to imaginary things and events and this strive draws together both perception (*aisthesis*) and thought (*noesis*). When perception fades away, representation sheds its light on forms, contents, colours, sounds, words, all these being the fittest tools for the artistic expression.

Without much warning, illusion transforms what seemed to belong to the individual world in a common property which offers itself to those who receive it. Those who are opaque to its charm or lose their illusions are the disappointed ones. To refuse illusion means to refuse living, feeding yourself, breathing the air around, but if we cannot accept dying of starvation, we must return to the illusion given by culture. As Constantin Noica said, ”doar prin cultură capătă omul investirea de a deosebi în sânul realității și de a rândui ceea ce a văzut.” (“Only by culture can the man receive the ability to distinguish the elements of reality and to order what he has seen” - our translation ) [42].

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